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In defence of his claim of the necessity of a dynamical theory of spacetime, Harvey Brown (Brown 2005; Brown and Pooley 2006; Brown and Timpson 2006) often appeals to the distinction between principle and constructive theories and to Special Relativity’s (SR, henceforth) character of principle theory. 
We could summarize Brown’s argument in the following:
1)	geometrical explanations provided by special relativity are not constructive theory explanations;  
2)	principle theories lack the explanatory power of constructive theories;
3)	ergo, we still don’t have a genuine explanation of length contraction. The latter can only be fully provided by a constructive theory.
The main aim of this paper is to analyse the actual role that the distinction between principle and constructive theories can have in the question of the explanatory power of SR. We will therefore assess and criticize the use that Brown makes of the dichotomy as misleading in presupposing an overly narrow idea of the kind of explanations provided by principle theories. 
Although this paper will take SR as a case study, the proposed analysis will more generally investigate how the distinction principle/constructive enters in the philosophical discussion about scientific explanation. A significant part of the arguments here exposed could therefore also be applied, mutatis mutandis, to other cases study.​[1]​
In advocating the view that, as a well established scientific theory, SR successfully explains relativistic phenomena, we will put forward the claim that SR provides structural explanations, a kind of mathematical explanation that was originally recognized by R.I.G. Hughes (Hughes 1989a/1989b). Section 2 is therefore devoted to a brief summary of the structural account of explanation.
Some of Brown’s reproaches to geometrical explanations in SR lie upon the characterization illustrated by Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen (2003) (henceforth, BJ) of the explanations provided respectively by principle and constructive theories (principle and constructive explanations, henceforth). In Section 3 the tenability of such a characterization is assessed, together with Brown’s arguments hinging on it. Section 4, concerning the question of what role the geometry of spacetime plays within the explanation of the kinematic behavior of bodies, provides an answer to Brown’s challenge to the genuine nature of mathematical explanations. Section 5 assesses the claim that even if acknowledged the explanatory power of the geometrical accounts, still a deeper explanation should be expected, explaining the structure of spacetime with the properties of matter. Finally, Section 6 provides some more general considerations about the legitimacy of normative arguments in the theory of scientific explanation.

2. Structural Explanation.
Before we start, we must put our cards down and spend a couple of words on a notion which will be often used throughout this paper. This is the hypothesis of the existence of a special kind of mathematical explanation in physics, which R.I.G. Hughes called structural explanation. 
A minimal definition of structural explanation is briefly provided by Rob Clifton:
We explain some feature B of the physical world by displaying a mathematical model of part of the world and demonstrating that there is a feature A of the model that corresponds to B. (Clifton 1998, 7)
In our understanding of Hughes’ account, the central feature of structural explanation lies in the fact that its validity is independent of the question of what categorial framework​[2]​ underlies the theory of reference. 
The importance of structural explanation was related from its very beginning to the problem of explanation within quantum theory. As an illustrative example, take the case of the explanation of the Uncertainty Relation between position (p) and momentum (q) (Dorato and Felline forthcoming). The existence of a minimum for the product of the uncertainties of these two measurements, or the non-simultaneous sharpness possessed by the two observables, represented formally by the equation:
	Δx Δp = ђ/2				(1)
is explained structurally by showing that, in the Hilbert space of square integrable functions (the mathematical model M), the formal representative (px, py, pz) of the observable momentum is the Fourier transform of the function (x, y, z), the formal representative of the position. Consequently, the structural explanation of the uncertainty relation exploits a well-known mathematical property of the Fourier transform: the narrower the interval in which one of the two functions differs significantly from zero, the larger is the interval in which its Fourier transform differs from zero, in such a way that Eq. 1 must be satisfied. 
The possibility of explaining physical phenomena with a mathematical model is based on the representation relation between the model and the target system. Such a relation more generally allows for the performance of surrogative reasoning​[3]​, i.e. to learn something about a target, by investigating on the model.
In the case of quantum theory, one of the most important virtues of structural explanation is that, notwithstanding the lack of an uncontroversial interpretation of the theory, quantum theory is still capable of providing genuine explanations and understanding of phenomena. Notice that, far from diminishing the explanatory power of quantum theory, this ‘agnostic’ character is a virtue of structural explanation. By being free from any metaphysical assumption about the world, structural explanation escapes the charge posed by Duhem – according to which scientific explanations are always metaphysical (Hughes 1989a) – and is independent of previous metaphysical assumptions that could be unjustified (or even dangerously inadequate) within a completely new theoretical framework. Moreover, they can also survive to theory change more stably than constructive explanations, with their ontological baggage.
While the idea of structural explanation has been mostly developed with quantum mechanics in mind, both Hughes and Clifton use Special Relativity as a template of a theory providing structural explanations:
Suppose we were asked to explain why one particular velocity (in fact the speed of light) is invariant across the set of inertial frames. […] [The Lorentzian] causal explanation is now seen as seriously misleading; a much better answer would involve sketching the models of space-time which special relativity provides and showing that in these models, for a certain family of pairs of events, not only is their special separation x proportional to their temporal separation t, but the quantity x/t is invariant across admissible (that is, inertial) coordinate systems; further, for all such pairs, x/t always has the same value. This answer makes no appeal to causality; rather it points out structural features of the models that special relativity provides. It is, in fact, an example of a structural explanation. (ibid 256-257) 
 In the following we will argue, contra Brown, that, if conceived of as structural explanations, the explanations provided by SR are genuine and successful.

3. Explanations in Principle and in Constructive theories.
In this section we will assess the characterization of the dichotomy as illustrated by BJ, as it seems to be acknowledged in many arguments put forward by Brown’s work​[4]​.  The aim of this section is to show that there is nothing like a ‘principle (or constructive) explanation’ as meant by Brown (Section 3.1). To the extent to which it is possible to isolate a unifying feature of principle explanations (Section 3.2), this feature alone does not imply a lack of explanatory power.
Here is BJ:
In a theory of principle […] one explains the phenomena by showing that they necessarily occur in a world in accordance with the postulates. Whereas theories of principle are about the phenomena, constructive theories aim to get at the underlying reality. In a constructive theory one proposes a (set of) model(s) for some part of physical reality […]. One explains the phenomena by showing that the theory provides a model that gives an empirically adequate description of the salient features of reality.
Consider the phenomenon of length contraction. Understood purely as a theory of principle, SR explains this phenomenon if it can be shown that the phenomenon necessarily occurs in any world that is in accordance with the relativity postulate and the light postulate. By its very nature such a theory-of-principle explanation will have nothing to say about the reality behind the phenomenon. A constructive version of the theory, by contrast, explains length contraction if the theory provides an empirically adequate model of the relevant features of a world in accordance with the two postulates. Such constructive-theory explanations do tell us how to conceive of the reality behind the phenomenon. (BJ 2003, 331)
  
3.1. D-N against model-based explanations, and the reality behind phenomena.
A very first feature of the characterization above is that constructive explanations are based on models of phenomena, while principle explanations use a Deductive-Nomological method. It seems clear that when Brown argues how little the principle explanation explains, he often has in mind such a D-N model of explanation in SR. This is evident, for instance, in (Brown and Pooley 2006), where, after illustrating the explanation provided by SR of length contraction as a mere derivation of the explanandum from the two fundamental postulates, the authors conclude: “What has been shown is that rods and clocks must behave in quite particular ways in order for the two postulates to be true together. But this hardly amounts to an explanation of such behaviour.” (7)
So, what are we to make with this first claim, that principle theories explain by deducing the explanandum from the fundamental postulates? Is there any reason to think that the explanations provided by a theory always trace out the method with which the latter has been built? Neither BJ nor Brown and Pooley provide any warrant for this assumption. Moreover, providing a D-N version of a scientific explanation, as Brown and Pooley do in the passage referred to above, is an easy game to play – and not only within principle theories, but also within constructive theories. The example, therefore, is not really pressing. 
What about the claim that only constructive theories provide model-based explanations? At the end of the day, all scientific theories provide models for the representation of the processes and systems they study. With these models in hand, principle, as well as constructive, theories can provide model-based explanations. 
In the specific case of SR, the resulting models are geometrical models representing the geometrical properties of spacetime. Furthermore, for the pluralistic view of explanation assumed in this paper, there is no reason to consider an explanation hinging on an abstract, mathematical model less explicative than, say, an explanation hinging on a causal explanation. In fact, that mathematical models can work as basis for scientific explanation is exactly the core of the structural account of explanation as illustrated in the previous section.
Related to the suggestion that they don’t provide model-based explanations, in the quotation above the secondary claim is also present that “[b]y its very nature […] a theory-of-principle explanation will have nothing to say about the reality behind the phenomenon”. 
However, the claim that principle theories do not tell us anything about the reality behind the phenomenon is, as it is, false. To be sure, a principle theory deduces its structure from general empirical principles, but from this point of departure it reconstructs claims about the world and models the reality it describes. In the case of Thermodynamics, it claims that isentropic processes are always adiabatic processes; SR makes claims about the relation between energy and rest mass. 
A possible understanding of the qualification ‘behind phenomena’ could be that while constructive theories are about the unobservable reality principle theories are about the observable reality. However, the fact that the theory hinges on empirical principles does not imply that the former cannot overtake this ‘superficiality’ and investigate the ‘deeper’ aspects of reality. Again, simply think to the great result E=mc2 in SR. Principle theories are grounded on empirical observations exactly as all scientific theories, and from the analysis of such empirical facts, they investigate the underlying reality. 
Finally, it is dubious that this characterization could help clearing up the features of the proposed dichotomy, due to the controversial status of the observable/unobservable dichotomy. 

3.2. Ontological commitments.
Let’s start all over again. It is not true that principle theories only provide D-N explanations, or that they concern phenomena rather than their underlying reality. In this subsection we will illustrate our reconstruction of the characterizing features of principle Vs constructive explanation and show how, on the one hand, it is more faithful both to Einstein’s original definition, on the other, it could make sense of some of Brown’s arguments in response to BJ. 
Consider that the Einstein’s dichotomy is basically methodological, concerning the kind of founding postulates and the analytical Vs synthetic method building the structure of the theory. By mere consideration of these factors, it could be said that the constructive synthetic method starting from hypothetically constructed elements typically carries more ontological assumptions than the analytic method starting from empirical postulates, characterizing principle theories. 
If this is right, the distinction between principle and constructive explanation could rather be characterized as concerning the degree to which they are committed to a categorial framework at the foundation of the explaining theory. According to this understanding of the distinction, while a constructive theory can provide what Salmon called an ontic explanation, this is not so for a principle theory. Just to give an example, a constructive explanation conceived in this way could exploit the ontological status of spacetime as a substance existing independently on things and processes or as the cluster of properties and relations between bodies, which do not exist independently of the existence of the latter. 
Notice how under this interpretation of the dichotomy, one could make (some​[5]​) sense of Brown’s and Pooley’s disagreement with BJ, pivoting on the question of whether the geometrical explanations of SR could be provided with a ‘constructive’ version. Reformulated according to the proposed reading, the question would mean: can we formulate an ontic version of the geometrical explanations provided by SR? ​[6]​
Furthermore, one can equally make sense of the parallel question addressed to in this dispute, of the interpretation of SR either as a principle or as a constructive theory. From the point of view of the present paper, this dispute is quite odd – given that according to Einstein’s methodological distinction SR is a principle theory, period. But if we rephrase it according to the proposed ‘interpretation’, the core of the dispute will be: if one can provide an ontic version of SR’s geometrical explanations, then SR can be interpreted as a successful (insofar as explicative) constructive theory; otherwise the opposite.​[7]​

 3.3. A relevant distinction?
The proposed reading of the BJ Vs Brown and Pooley dispute has the virtue of making sense of some of Brown’s arguments. In this subsection we will show that, if we are right in our reconstruction, Brown’s arguments still remain erroneous in different ways: to the extent to which something like a principle and a constructive explanation exist, the latter doesn’t allow the inference of Brown’s conclusions. 
On the one hand, and as we’ve already said, according to Einstein’s original distinction SR is a principle theory. This in turn implies that the attempt to translate the geometrical explanations into an ontic explanation (where the ontology of spacetime plays a special role) necessarily misleads the meaning of the geometrical account. We will see the practical consequences of such a misunderstanding in the next sections. 
Secondly, one has to keep in mind that the distinction is in no way categorical, as, say, constructive theories always display principle elements​[8]​. This implies that it is not true that only principle theories can provide principle (i.e. ontologically agnostic) explanations, as also within constructive theories this kind of explanation can be useful and successful. This is the case of quantum theory, but also of Pincock’s abstract explanations (Pincock 2007) or, to some extent, of Batterman’s asymptotic explanations (Batterman 2002). 
Third, for what has been said in Section2, it can well be not only that an agnostic explanation is satisfactory, but that it is the most effective explanation even in face of an alternative ontic explanation. For instance, the former could have a more general application, or would be less fragile than the latter under theory change. In our case, the use of classical electrodynamics to explain the Lorentz contraction constructively is fragile since we know that it is not the true theory.
Of course, Brown's response could be that even though we know classical electrodynamics is not the final theory of matter, we do know that whatever that final theory is, it will be Lorentz covariant and approximated by classical electrodynamics. Therefore we do know that we can explain the Lorentz contraction constructively in it. 
But the above amounts to say that, whatever the theory of matter is that accounts for the behaviour of bodies, it will be Lorentz covariant and from that covariance the Lorentz contraction follows – and what we have just sketched is exactly a principle (in the sense of ontologically agnostic) explanation​[9]​!

4. The Dormative virtue.
Following Brown and Pooley (2006), within a constructive explanation where spacetime models are the explananda, the explanatory role of spacetime is supposed to lie on its ‘action’ on material bodies, for instance ‘shaping’ rods. On the other hand, this account of length contraction implies an interpretation of spacetime as a ‘special entity’ ‘acting’ on bodies without being affected by them, violating in this way the action-reaction principle. The ontological characterization of spacetime coming out from this picture is, they conclude, unacceptable. 
The questionable premise of this argument, that the sole explicative role conceived for spacetime is causal, has already been criticized elsewhere (Dorato 2007; Hagar 2008). However, it is not even clear whether this should be so because explanations in general are causal, or because constructive explanations are necessarily causal. We just want to notice that the hypothesis put forward in the previous section – that with ‘constructive explanations’ one has to read ‘ontic explanation’ in Salmon’s sense – also well accounts for the implicit premise of the above argument that explanatorily relevant means causally relevant. Salmon’s ontic conception’s probably most serious problem is that it does not isolate the explanatorily relevant from the irrelevant facts. The most natural completion of the ontic conception (and the one adopted by Salmon) is therefore that the explanatorily relevant facts are those causally relevant. 
It follows that the proposed understanding of Brown’s constructive explanation well accounts for Brown’s belief that the only constructive explanatory role for spacetime is a causal role. 
The rest of this section will focus on Brown’s criticism that it is not clear how the structure of spacetime does more explanatory work than Moliere’s dormative virtue in opium (Brown and Pooley 2006, 13). The objection also refers to the claim that spacetime geometry is but a codification of certain key aspect of the kinematics of bodies (ibid 4) in the same way that Moliere’s dormative virtue is nothing but a restatement of the explanandum phenomenon, with no additional information or enhancing of knowledge.
Admittedly this objection hits structural explanation where it hurts: the discussion about how mathematical explanations of physical phenomena work is far from being exhausted. However, it is also far from groping in the dark. As a start, by representing the world with a mathematical model we transfer our knowledge of the model to a knowledge of the world, and therefore also enhance our knowledge of the latter. In order to allow for the production of novel knowledge with the surrogative reasoning performed on them, models must have an internal dynamics which is independent of the known structure of the target but which allows the subject to perform deductions and therefore draw conclusions about the system (Hughes 1997). In our case – where the surrogative reasoning exploits the mathematical properties of the models displayed by the theory – the role of the internal structure of the model is to allow us to be guided in our inquiries by well confirmed laws and properties, which are the laws and properties of the mathematical model (see Pincock 2007).  
So, Brown and Pooley wonder how the structure of spacetime does more explanatory work than Moliere’s dormative virtue in opium. Our answer is that in appealing to Minkowskian geometry, and in virtue of the representation relation between the mathematical model and the target, one can exploit the more solid mathematical knowledge that we have of the geometrical model as if it were knowledge of the structural relations of the target. 
Moreover, it is exactly the use of a mathematical language that allows us to investigate the properties of the target while remaining ignorant about many of its features. Since what is relevant here are the geometrical properties of spacetime and the fact that they are instantiated by our world, the same account could be held both within a relational and a substantialist view of spacetime. 

5. The Cart Before the Horse.
As of yet one could acknowledge the explanatory power of SR but still claim for a dynamical explanation of spacetime properties. 
It could be argued, in fact, that the explanations provided by SR could be considered completely satisfactory only if one assumes the fundamentality of the spacetime structure. Otherwise, there would always be space, and indeed necessity, of a more fundamental theory explaining the structure of spacetime. On the other hand, the argument goes, due to the ontic ‘agnosticism’ innate in principle theories, SR’s belonging to this category thwarts from claiming that the geometry of spacetime represents a fundamental structure​[10]​. Therefore, the argument continues, either SR is provided with a constructive interpretation (like the one criticized by Brown in Ch.8.2 of his book), as we don’t want, or it leaves a gap which could be filled by a fundamental (constructive) theory of matter inferring spacetime properties. Finally, from such a constructive theory a deeper and more satisfactory explanation, following the arrow of ontological priority, will come out​[11]​.
In order to answer this last argument, notice first of all that the claim about the necessity of a deeper (constructive) explanation hinges on the hypothesis of an ontological priority of matter properties with respect to spacetime properties, whose plausibility is yet to be proved.
Secondly, while we have acknowledged that constructive theories tend to carry with them more ontological assumptions, the question of the ontological foundations of a theory is never a straightforward question, both within constructive and principle theories. This is also because the answer to such a question never only depend on the theory itself, but on the whole rest of scientific background knowledge. All the more so when one is concerned with questions about the fundamental status of quantities or entities. 
Therefore, in the light of our background scientific knowledge, do we have good reasons to think that a more fundamental theory is in sight? Hitherto, all signs rather suggest a negative answer and that spacetime properties are to be considered as fundamental. Our best theory of matter is not even close to reconstructing the geometrical properties of spacetime and, on the other hand, we have convincing arguments denying the ontological priority of matter on spacetime properties, or showing the difficulties that a constructive theory of the kind advocated by Brown would run into (see for instance Norton 2006; Hagar 2008). If it is therefore surely true that principle theories in themselves could be completed by a complementary constructive theory, the fact that this is also the case of SR is far to be plausible. 

6. Conclusions.
We have proposed an analysis of the way in which the distinction between principle and constructive theories could enter in the evaluation of the explanatory power of a scientific theory. We’ve especially focused on the claim that, due to its nature as a principle theory, Einstein’s SR leaves an explanatory gap, which is to be filled by a dynamical theory of spacetime. The general conclusion of the arguments here proposed is that Brown uses too many unwarranted assumptions about explanations in principle as in constructive theories, assumptions which undermine his account of explanation in SR. SR’s explanations are neither mere deductions, nor fallacious causal explanations, nor fallback explanations in view of a forthcoming complete explanation. Nothing in SR’s being a principle theory implies any of these claims.
As the proposed analysis has been developed purely at the level of the theory of scientific explanation, a more straightforward defence of the explanatory power of SR would have invoked a full-blown account of mathematical explanations or mathematical explanations in physics. Alas, we still lack of it. However, there is yet a more general answer that one could give to Brown’s arguments. What we think came out from our analysis is that Brown’s first mistake consists in the attempt to apply traditional accounts of explanation to SR and to conclude, from the fact that SR does not conform to them, that SR does not explain. Rather, the most logical conclusion to be drawn is the inadequacy of traditional standards of explanation, which could be successful in the context of other theories, in the case of SR. 
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^1	  For instance, to Jeff Bub’s interpretation of quantum theory as a principle theory.
^2	  A categorial framework is the set of fundamental metaphysical assumptions about what sorts of entities and what sorts of processes lie within a theory’s domain (Hughes 1989b).
^3	  I mostly refer to Hughes’ Denotation Demonstration Interpretation account of scientific representation (1997). The term surrogative reasoning is taken from (Swoyer 1991)
^4	  See (Brown and Pooley 2006), note 9.
^5	  but see next subsection.
^6	  In this section we are concerned with Brown’s and Pooley’s answer to BJ, where they acknowledge the latter’s characterization and where no reference is made to a characterization of constructive explanations as hinging on the microphysical constitution of bodies. That having been said, Section 5 will also assess the view that in constructive explanations the relevant facts concern the microphysical constitution of bodies.
^7	  In Ch.8.2 of Brown’s book the question is manifestly put in these terms. The same cannot be said, though, about (BJ 2003) and (Janssen 2008). We take the proposed view as mostly useful as a re-interpretation of Brown’s arguments.
^8	  That the distinction principle/constructive is not categorical is well admitted by Brown and Timpson (2006 32), whose arguments and conclusions, though, conflict with this intuition.
^9	  I owe this point to a suggestion from John Norton.
^10	  “As long as we view SR strictly as a theory of principle in the sense in which it was defined above, there are no grounds for preferring one constructive-theory explanation over another.” (BJ 2003, 10) Where the two constructive theories explanations are BJ’s orthodox and the neo-Lorentzian views.
^11	  As already mentioned in Section 3, we take the arguments proposed in the present Section as also addressing the claim that constructive explanations, understood as hinging on the microphysical details of bodies, are necessary in order to explain physical phenomena.
